报告题目：Filling the Monitoring Void: Lead Arranger Distraction and Borrower Disclosure

报告所属学科：工商管理

报告人：李雄（中国科学技术大学）

报告时间：2026年4月13日 9:30-13:30

报告地点：经管学院602室

报告摘要：

This study examines how syndicated loan borrowers adjust disclosure behavior when their lead lenders are distracted by other borrowers in their portfolios. We posit that non-lead loan syndicate participants seek alternative sources of information from borrowers to compensate for reduced monitoring by lead arrangers. Using debt covenant violations of other borrowers in lenders’ portfolios as a proxy for lead arranger “distraction”, we show that borrowers with distracted lead arrangers issue more forward-looking guidance. This effect is more pronounced when syndicate participants possess greater bargaining power, face heightened information needs, or are exposed to higher credit risks, consistent with increased syndicate participant-driven demand for information. We further find that lender distraction is associated with more stringent loan terms in subsequent lending. These results are robust to alternative specification and distraction measures. Overall, our findings offer new insights into the monitoring role of non-lead lenders in the syndicated loan market, a topic previously unexplored in the debt contracting literature.

报告人简介：

李雄，中国科学技术大学管理学院和科技商学院特任副教授，硕士研究生导师。博士毕业于香港大学，曾在美国华盛顿圣路易斯大学做访问学者。主要研究领域为供应链金融。目前有多篇工作论文在金融和会计的领域顶刊返修。